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Abstract. The capital income tax cuts that were part of the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 are expiring this year and the administration
has to decide whether to extend them or not. This paper assesses the eﬀects of these
tax cuts in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium framework with uninsurable labor
income risk. In particular, it looks at the eﬀects of dividend and capital gains taxes on
investment and welfare in a framework where ﬁrms are the owners of capital and make
investment decisions to maximize their market value. While the eﬀects of capital gains
taxes are qualitatively similar to those found when households own the capital, we ﬁnd
that the eﬀects of dividend taxes are diﬀerent. Surprisingly, a dividend tax cut leads
to a reduction in investment. The reason is that it raises the market valuation of the
existing capital stock and households require a lower capital stock to maintain the same
level of wealth. As a consequence, dividend tax cuts are welfare reducing in the long
run, not only because of the traditional reasons of redistribution from the poor to rich,
but also because of a fall in aggregate production and consumption. Taking into account
the transition mitigates the losses. Still, with our benchmark calibration, a reduction of
dividend and capital gains taxes from 31% and 24% to 19% leads to a reduction of more
than 0.5% in aggregate welfare in consumption equivalent terms.
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11. Introduction
In 2001, the Bush Administration introduced the Economic Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act (EGTRRA) which, amongst other reforms, lowered dividend and capital gains taxes.
In 2003, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) accelerated the
EGTRRA provisions and introduced further reductions in dividend and capital gains taxes.
These two acts are expected to sunset this year and the current administration has to decide
whether to extend them or not. This paper attempts to shed light into the quantitative
eﬀects of these capital income tax changes using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model that is calibrated to US data.
Discussions on tax policy, especially capital income tax policy, have always been politi-
cally divisive. One of the reasons is that economic theory provides arguments for both sides
of the discussion. On the one hand, reductions in capital taxes are viewed as providing
incentives for investment and, hence, leading to higher economic growth. On the other hand,
reductions in capital taxes are viewed as negative because of the resulting increase in budget
deﬁcits as well as in inequality. Although there seems to be a presumption that reductions in
capital taxes would disproportionately favor the wealthiest part of the distribution, it is well
known that those relying mainly on labor income could also see substantial beneﬁts arising
from the general equilibrium eﬀects of increased investment on wages and employment. In
this paper, we aim to disentangle the theoretical eﬀects of changes in dividend and capital
gains taxes but also to provide a quantitative analysis of the size of the costs and beneﬁts
associated with these reforms.
To that end, we build a general equilibrium economy in which households face uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor income risk. In addition to risky labor income, households receive capital
income from owning shares in ﬁrms. Both labor income and capital income are taxed by the
government. Importantly, the government taxes both dividends and capital gains, potentially
at diﬀerent rates. Firms in our model undertake investment with a view to maximizing
shareholder value. We use the results in Cárceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani (2009) to ensure
shareholder unanimity with respect to this objective despite the presence of shareholder
heterogeneity and market incompleteness. Two assumptions are crucial for this: constant
returns to scale production and no short-selling constraints. We calibrate the model to US
data and compute long run steady states as well as transitions.
Our results regarding steady states are as follows. A reduction in dividend tax rates has
the surprising eﬀect of reducing steady state investment and capital stock. The reason is that
this tax change raises the market valuation of the existing capital stock and, hence, house-
hold’s wealth. Households, facing the same level of uncertainty as before, now hold too much
wealth compared to the optimum and desire a reduction in the aggregate capital stock. In
equilibrium, this leads to an increase in the return on the riskless asset and a decrease in the
capital stock. This suggests that a reduction in dividend taxes might have the exact opposite
eﬀects on investment to those intended. It also has sharp predictions regarding the welfare
consequences of the dividend tax decrease. Whereas previous studies of capital income taxa-
tion1 tend to ﬁnd that negative distributional eﬀects of such reforms are partially mitigated
1See e.g. Aiyagari (1995), Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Abraham and Carceles-Poveda (2010).
2by the implied increased eﬃciency, we ﬁnd that both eﬃc i e n c ya n dd i s t r i b u t i o ng oi nt h e
wrong direction. Speciﬁcally, when we decompose the welfare eﬀects into "aggregate" and
"distributional" components, following the methodology proposed by Domeij and Heathcote
(2004), we ﬁnd that both of these components are negative. The "aggregate" component
refers to the welfare eﬀect arising from a change in aggregate consumption, for a given dis-
tribution of consumption across households. Here, aggregate capital falls and so does long
run aggregate consumption, so this eﬀect is unambiguously negative. The "distributional"
component captures the eﬀect of changes in the distribution of consumption and is computed
as a residual. In line with previous studies, we ﬁnd that the distributional component of the
reform is negative. The reason is straightforward. A reduction in dividend taxes beneﬁts
households in the upper tail of the wealth distribution and hurts those in the lower tail. In
turn, the marginal utility of the latter households is higher (and there is more of them) so
that aggregate welfare falls. Because of the fall in capital this negative redistribution is more
pronounced than in previous studies, since the bottom of the wealth distribution, which relies
mostly on labor income, now faces an endogenous, general equilibrium eﬀect on wages that
is also negative.
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀects of a reduction in capital gains tax rates, we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect
on the capital stock and a small but positive eﬀect on welfare. Contrary to the dividend
tax, the capital gains tax acts as a standard capital income tax, eﬀectively reducing the
after tax return of capital. A decrease in such a tax, has an unambiguous positive eﬀect on
investment and hence on aggregate consumption and on the aggregate component of welfare.
In addition, there are no negative distributional eﬀects in the steady state. The reason is
that the government raises no revenues from capital gains taxation at steady state, since
stock prices are constant, so the decrease in capital gains tax does not have a direct eﬀect
on the government’s budget. However, the indirect eﬀect, through an increase in investment
and, thus, wages is actually positive. Therefore the capital gains tax reduction actually
improves the government budget and it allows for lower labor income tax rates. As a result,
the distributional component of welfare is also positive. Overall, we conclude that reducing
capital gains taxes is welfare improving in the long run.
When the dividend and capital gains taxes are reduced simultaneously, the dividend tax
cut eﬀects dominate and the overall eﬀect is a reduction in aggregate social welfare. The
dividend tax cut dominates for two reasons: ﬁrst, as explained above, steady state eﬀects
of capital gains taxes are only of second order. Second, the actual reduction in the capital
gains tax rate in the 2003 reform was smaller than the one on dividends.
Looking at steady states allows us to clarify the intuition for our results and understand
the qualitative mechanisms taking place in our model. However, for obtaining a quantitative
assessment of the welfare eﬀects of the tax reform it is imperative that we consider the
transition. In fact, it is well known that results about the long run are often mitigated and
sometimes even reversed when the short run eﬀects are included. In our case, it is clear that
this could be so. After all, a reduction in the capital stock arising from the dividend tax
cut will reduce aggregate consumption in the long run but increase aggregate consumption
in the short run. We therefore conduct our experiment including the transition period. The
3experiment is as follows. The economy begins at a steady state with dividend taxes that are
equal to 31% and capital gains taxes that are equal to 24%. These are the marginal tax rates
before the Bush dividend tax cuts. The two rates are then reduced to 19%, corresponding to
the marginal tax rates after the reform. All the tax changes are assumed to be unexpected
and perceived as permanent. Subsequently, the economy is simulated until convergence to
the new steady state.
The transitional path is as expected. Aggregate capital falls monotonically to the new
steady state. Aggregate consumption initially increases as the economy starts dissaving but
eventually falls below the original level as production is reduced due to lower investment.
Overall, welfare falls by approximately 05% (in terms of consumption equivalents). The
decomposition shows a positive aggregate eﬀect arising from the immediate consumption
hike, but a larger negative distributional eﬀect. In terms of winners and losers, we ﬁnd
that individuals at the low end of labor productivity and those holding zero or very few
stocks stand to lose from the reform, whereas those holding a lot of stocks stand to gain. In
terms of "political support", we ﬁnd that only 20% of the population experiences a welfare
improvement.
Related Literature. From a theoretical perspective, this paper can be seen as bridg-
ing the gap between two strands of literature. The ﬁrst strand includes the articles that
analyze optimal taxation and/or tax reforms in the presence of heterogeneity and uninsured
idiosyncratic risk (see e.g. Aiyagari (1995), Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Ábrahám
and Cárceles-Poveda (2010)). Our paper is most closely related to this literature and our
methodology is directly borrowed from those articles. A purely cosmetic diﬀerence is in our
choice of modelling ﬁrms as the owners of the capital stock, which we view as the most
natural setup in which to think of dividend and capital gains taxes.2 Our only substantial
diﬀerence arises from our explicit modelling of dividends and capital gains taxes as opposed
to a general capital income tax.
The second strand of the literature is the one focusing on the eﬀects of dividend taxes on
capital accumulation and the stock market in a framework with no household heterogeneity.
McGrattan and Prescott (2005), Santoro and Wei (2009a) and Gourio and Miao (2008) show
that, in such a setting, a constant ﬂat-rate dividend tax is not distortionary. Subsequently,
several modiﬁcations have been applied to the representative agent framework which render
the dividend tax distortionary. For example, if households and ﬁrms face a non-constant
dividend tax rate proﬁle (for example because the tax reform is only temporary), then these
taxes will aﬀect capital accumulation.3 In this paper, however, we abstract from this by
assuming dividend taxes are changed permanently and unexpectedly.
Another important consideration in determining whether dividend taxes are distortionary
relates to one’s view about what is the marginal source of ﬁnancing for corporations. Follow-
ing Poterba and Summers (1983), if the marginal source of ﬁnancing is new equity (traditional
2An equivalent formulation that is more standard in the literature with static ﬁrms that rent capital from
consumers is available upon request. See Carceles-Poveda and Coen Pirani (2010) for a general equivalence
result with incomplete markets.
3A non-constant dividend tax proﬁle is introduced by McGrattan (2009), by Gourio and Miao (2008) and,
indirectly, by Santoro and Wei (2009b).
4view), then a decrease in dividend taxes increases investment. Alternatively, if the marginal
source of ﬁnancing is retained earnings (new view), then dividend taxes do not distort invest-
ment decisions.4 In an interesting recent article, Gourio and Miao (2010) ﬁnd distortionary
eﬀects of dividend taxes by allowing for ﬁrm heterogeneity. Mature ﬁrms, which are in the
dividend paying stage of their life cycle, conform to the new view and are not directly aﬀected
by constant dividend taxes. Growing ﬁrms, however, conform to the traditional view and
are aﬀected. Overall, they ﬁnd that a reduction in dividend taxes increases investment by
directly aﬀecting growing ﬁrms and by changing the composition of ﬁrms in the economy. In
our setting, however, the representative ﬁrm conforms to the new view and acts as a mature,
dividend paying ﬁrm, implying that those eﬀects are absent.5
To summarize, our point of departure is a benchmark model where ﬁrms conform to
the new view, dividend tax changes are permanent and unexpected and, as a result, in the
absence of household heterogeneity these changes have no eﬀect on capital. We then add
household heterogeneity and ﬁnd that a decrease in dividend taxes, decreases investment
and the long run capital stock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 discusses the theoretical eﬀects of the tax cuts and provides intuition for the results. In
Section 4, we calibrate the model to US data and provide a quantitative evaluation of the
welfare implications of the Bush tax reforms both in the long run and along the transition.
Section 5 conducts some sensitivity analysis and Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Model
We consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with endogenous production and uninsurable labor
income risk. The economy is populated by a continuum (measure 1) of inﬁnitely lived
households that are indexed by  ∈ , a representative ﬁrm that maximizes its market
value and a government that maintains a balanced budget. Time is discrete and indexed by
 =0 12
2.1. Households. Households have identical additively separable preferences over se-
quences of consumption  ≡ {}
∞





4Although Poterba and Summers (1983) seem to ﬁnd evidence against the new view and in favor of the
traditional view, recent work by Auerbach and Hassett (2005), that focuses speciﬁcally on the 2003 JGTRRA
reform, ﬁnds evidence in support of the new view, which is the one we adopt in the present paper. In addition,
Sinn (1991) ﬁnds that "...most corporate equity capital is generated by internal investment rather than new
share issues", a fact also supporting the new view. The recent theoretical literature discussed above seems
to have adopted this view, at least as a benchmark.
5Since we introduce household heterogeneity we need to abstract from ﬁrm heterogeneity in order to
maintain tractability. In this sense, our work is complementary to the one by Gourio and Miao (2010). Given
ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm framework, it also seems reasonable to assume the ﬁrm is mature, particularly in light
of Gourio and Miao’s (2010) ﬁnding, using Compustat data, that the overwhelming majority of investment
is carried out by these types of ﬁrms.
5where  ∈ (01) is the subjective discount factor and 0 denotes the expectation conditional
on information at date  =0 . The period utility function (·):R+ → R is assumed to be
strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable, with lim→0 0()=∞
and lim→∞ 0()=0 .
Each period, households can only trade in stocks of the ﬁrm to insure against uncertainty.
We denote by −1 the number of stocks held at the beginning of period .S t o c k sc a n b e
traded between households at a competitive price of  and the ownership of stocks entitles the
shareholder to a dividend per share of . We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty,
implying that dividends, the stock price and hence the return on the stock are certain.
In addition to asset income, household  ∈  earns labor income. We assume that all
households supply a ﬁxed amount of labor (normalized to one) but their productivity, ,
varies stochastically. This productivity is i.i.d. across households and follows a Markov
process with transition matrix Π(0|) and  possible values. Individual labor income is
thus equal to ,w h e r e is the aggregate wage rate.
The government levies proportional taxes on labor income, dividend income and capital
gains income at the rates of ,  and  respectively. Households can use their after-tax
income from all sources to purchase consumption goods or to purchase additional stocks.
The households’ budget constraint can thus be expressed as:
 +  =( 1− ) +( ( 1− ) + )−1 −  ( − −1)−1 (2)
Note that we have simpliﬁed in assuming capital gains taxes are paid on an accrual basis
and that capital losses are subsidized at the same rate6. At each date, household  ∈  also
faces a no short-selling constraint on stocks:
 ≥ 0 (3)
The presence of this constraint will allow us to have a well-deﬁned ﬁrm objective on
which all the shareholders agree, despite the market incompleteness. Individuals choose how
much to consume and how many stocks to buy in each period given prices, dividends and
tax rates { }∞
=0.
Before proceeding with the description of the ﬁrm, we derive the price dividend mapping,
which is the relationship between stock prices and future dividends. This will be useful later
to deﬁne the value of the ﬁrm as well as to derive the relationship between physical capital
and the stock price. To do this, we use the optimality conditions of the households. The
optimal choice of stocks by any unconstrained household  ∈  with   0 requires the
following optimality condition to hold:
 = +1 [(1 − )+1 + +1 −  (+1 − )] (4)
where  represents the marginal utility of the agent. As usual, the expected intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution for all unconstrained households are equalized and they are





[(1 − )+1 + +1 −  (+1 − )]

(5)
6For a way to model capital gains taxes on a realization basis see Kydland, Gavin and Pakko (2007).
6Using this relationship, the absence of aggregate uncertainty and assuming that there are














2.2. The Firm. The representative ﬁrm owns the capital stock , hires labor and com-
bines these two inputs to produce consumption goods using a constant returns to scale
technology:
 = ( )
where  and  are the aggregate capital and eﬀective labor, while  is the total factor
productivity, which is assumed to be constant. The total number of stocks outstanding is
normalized to one and we assume that the ﬁrm has no access to additional sources of external
ﬁnance, namely, it cannot issue new equity or debt. Thus the total wage bill and investment
as well as the distributions of dividends to shareholders have to be ﬁnanced solely using
internal funds.8 The ﬁrm is not allowed to use repurchases as a means of distributing proﬁts
to shareholders. The ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing constraint is therefore:
 + +1 − (1 − ) +  = ( ) (7)
where  ∈ [01] is the capital depreciation rate.
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize its market value for the shareholders. In general,
when markets are incomplete, maximizing the value of the ﬁrm is not an objective to which
all shareholders would agree. However, Cárceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani (2009) show that
even under incomplete markets, shareholder unanimity can be obtained if the technology
exhibits constant returns to scale and short-selling is not allowed. We maintain these two
assumptions throughout the paper. Using the price-dividend mapping (6),t h ev a l u eo ft h e

















Maximizing this objective subject to (7) leads to the aggregate labor demand equation:
 =  ( ) (8)






(1 −  +  (+1 +1)) (9)
As shown in Appendix A, this last expression together with (6) implies the following relation





7The derivation of the expressions in this section can be found in Appendix A.
8We do not allow ﬁrms to use repurchases as a means of distributing proﬁts. See Gordon and Dietz (2009)
for a discussion of alternative ways to ensure ﬁrms pay dividends.
72.3. Government. In each period , the government consumes a constant amount  and
taxes labor, dividend and capital gains income at the rates ,  and  respectively. We
assume that the government has a balanced budget. The government budget constraint is
therefore given by:
 =  +  + ( − −1) (11)
2.4. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium. In the present framework, the aggregate
state of the economy is given by the aggregate capital stock  and by the joint distribution
Ψ of consumers over individual stock holdings  and idiosyncratic productivity status .
Households perceive that Ψ evolves according to:
Ψ0 = Γ(Ψ)
where Γ represents the transition function from the current aggregate state into tomorrow’s
wealth-productivity distribution. The aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
0 = Φ(Ψ)
Since the individual state vector includes the individual labour productivity and stock
holdings (), the relevant state variables for a household are summarized by the vector
(;Ψ).9
Deﬁnition: Given the transition matrix Π, as well as an initial value for the aggregate
capital stock 0 and for the initial distribution of stocks and productivity Ψ0,arecursive
competitive equilibrium relative to a government policy () consists of laws of
motion Γ and Φ, stock price and wage functions (0) and (), ﬁrm choices 0, ()
and (0) and individual household policy functions (;Ψ) and (;Ψ),a sw e l l
as associated value functions  (;Ψ) such that:
• Optimal Household Choice: Given prices and aggregates, the individual policy func-
tions and the value functions (;Ψ), (;Ψ) and  (;Ψ) solve the prob-
lem of the households:





























9Note that, contrary to a framework were households own the capital directly, the aggregate capital 
contains additional information on top of Ψ. The additional information consists essentially of the past stock
price, which could equivalently be used as a state variable instead of .
8• Firm Value Maximization: Given prices, 0, () and (0) satisfy ﬁrm optimal-












= (()) + (1 − ) − 0 − ()()

















(;Ψ)Ψ()+0 +  = (()) + (1 − )
• Consistency: Γ and Φ are consistent with the agents’ optimal decisions.
3. A Qualitative Analysis
One of the main results in this paper is that, in the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic risk,
a reduction in dividend taxes reduces the capital stock. This section explains why this has to
be the case theoretically, while the following section evaluates the quantitative importance
of this eﬀect in the context of the 2003 tax reform both in the long run and throughout the
transition. Our discussion in this section focuses on steady states.
To understand the eﬀects of taxes on distributions on the capital stock, the three key
equations are the stock Euler equation in (5), the capital Euler equation in (9) and the
price-capital relationship in (10). The ﬁrst one describes the optimal choice of stocks by
households, the second one describes the optimal choice of capital by the ﬁrm, and the third
one describes the relationship between assets inside the ﬁrm (the capital stock) and assets
outside the ﬁrm (the market value of stocks). This last relationship provides the value of
Tobin’s  = 1−
1− and it states that one unit of capital inside the ﬁrm is valued at  by
investors. If there are no taxes on capital gains and dividends, or if these two taxes are the
same, then  =1 . This implies that the value of capital inside the ﬁrm is equal to the value
of the ﬁrm’s equity. In that case, our model is equivalent to an Aiyagari (1994) economy
where households make the investment decisions.10
Before moving on to the main case where  6=1 , it will be helpful to build the analogy
between the standard Aiyagari model with static ﬁrms and our economy with dynamic ﬁrms
in the benchmark case where  =1 . To that end, we ﬁrst describe how to obtain the
standard ﬁgure describing the equilibrium with incomplete markets (Figure 1) when ﬁrms
and households trade in stocks rather than in physical capital stock.










The curve labelled  represents equation (5), which is the total value of assets (wealth)
desired by households as a function of the stock return .N o t et h a t is simply the stock
price times the aggregate demand for stocks. In a standard Aiyagari economy, this would
correspond to the aggregate demand for capital. As already shown by Aiyagari (1994), when
markets are incomplete, the aggregate demand for assets is increasing in  and it tends to
inﬁnity as the return approaches the time preference rate 1
 −1 because of the precautionary
savings motive. The curve labelled  represents equation (9), which is the ﬁrm’s desired
capital stock as a function of . Finally, the curve labelled  represents the market value of
assets supplied by the ﬁrm as a function of . This is obtained in two steps. First, we obtain
the ﬁrm’s desired capital as a function of  from equation (9). Then, the market value 
of this capital stock schedule is computed by multiplying it by .11
In the benchmark case with  =1 ,  =  and the  schedule coincides with the 
schedule, as in a standard Aiyagari economy. The equilibrium return ∗ and the equilibrium
value of assets held ∗ are found at the intersection of the supply  and the demand 
for stocks, while the equilibrium level of the capital stock can be read oﬀ the  curve once
∗ is known. Now suppose there is a diﬀerence in dividend and capital gains tax rates and
suppose for the sake of exposition that    so that 1, as has been the case historically
for the US. A unit of capital in the ﬁrm is now worth less than one unit to the shareholders.
As a result, the value of stocks  and the value of the physical capital  invested by the
ﬁrm will not be the same. Figure 2 shows how to obtain the equilibrium return in the stock
market and the implied capital stock in such an economy. Similarly to the previous case, 
is simply a depiction of the demand for wealth given by the stock Euler (5). To obtain the
11Recall that the aggregate supply of stocks is normalized to 1, so the value of the stocks supplied represented
by  is simply the stock price .
10supply ,t h eﬁrst step is the same as before, namely, we plot the capital stock  given in
(9). But when we translate this into the supply of assets by multiplying it by ,t h e curve
is now below the  curve because 1. The equilibrium in the stock market is (∗ ∗) and













Consider now a decrease in , keeping  ﬁxed. Keeping everything else ﬁxed12,t h i s
has no direct eﬀect on the  and  schedules but it does increase  and therefore shifts
the  schedule to the right. The new  curve is the dashed line shown in Figure 313.A
decrease in dividend taxes raises the rate of return and, interestingly, has opposite eﬀects on
the stock price and the aggregate capital stock, raising the former and reducing the latter.
The intuition is straightforward. At the prevailing rate ∗, households want to hold the same
wealth as before and ﬁrms want to invest the same capital stock as before. But this capital
stock is now valued more so that the supply of wealth is now higher. In order to induce
households to hold more wealth, the return on stocks has to increase and this increase serves
as the signal to the ﬁrm to start reducing the capital stock.
12Strictly speaking, keeping everything else ﬁxed would require the introduction of individual speciﬁcl u m p
sum taxes that would undo any eﬀects the tax change has on budget constraints other than the stock price
eﬀect.













This result suggests that using a cut in dividend taxes as a way to promote investment
can actually have negative eﬀects on the capital stock and achieve the exact opposite eﬀect.
A crucial aspect required to yield this result is that the desired wealth held by households
is not perfectly elastic, as it would be in a complete markets inﬁnite horizon economy. This
situation is depicted in Figure 4. After a decrease in the dividend tax, the stock price
increases proportionally to the change in the tax. The wealth held by individuals is now
higher than before, but agents are content to hold this higher amount of wealth as long as
the return remains at the time preference rate. The end result is that capital (and all other
variables except the stock price) is unaﬀected by the change in the dividend tax, which is
not distortionary. This is the essence of Proposition 2 in McGrattan and Prescott (2005)
and Proposition 1 in Santoro and Wei (2009).
An alternative extreme would postulate that the desired wealth schedule  is perfectly
inelastic. Indeed, this would be a formalization of the intuition given by Poterba and Sum-
mers (1983), who argue that " If the desired wealth-to-income ratio is ﬁxed, then an increase
in the dividend tax, which reduces each capital good’s market value, will actually increase
equilibrium capital intensity". This intuition is not borne out of their model, which con-
forms to the standard inﬁnite horizon complete markets model and therefore predicts no
eﬀects of dividend taxes on the capital stock. But our Bewley economy delivers this intu-











The preceding discussion essentially analyzes the eﬀects of an increase in .T h i s c a n
arise through any combination of changes in  and  that increases 1−
1−.H o w e v e r ,t h e r e
are two important diﬀerences between the two tax changes. First, a reduction in  reduces
 and leads to the exact opposite eﬀects to those discussed above. In particular, a decrease
in , will raise the capital stock but reduce the stock price, ceteris paribus. Second, when
 falls but  is kept ﬁxed, the dividend tax change does not distort decisions in any other
way and in particular it does not distort the capital Euler equation. This means that 
aﬀects the equilibrium only through its eﬀect on . By contrast, a change in  directly
distorts the capital Euler equation and therefore has additional eﬀects that are more closely
related to the standard eﬀects of capital taxes. In particular, a decrease in the capital gains
tax rate reduces the cost of capital 
1− and this has the direct eﬀect of shifting the  curve
outwards. The implied wealth provided by the ﬁrm is therefore also shifted outward, keeping
 ﬁxed. So, the capital stock increases for two reasons after a decrease in , but the stock
price could go either way depending on which eﬀect is stronger.14
To summarize, in our economy, a reduction in dividend taxes reduces the capital stock
and increases the stock price but a reduction in capital gains taxes increases the capital
stock and has ambiguous eﬀects on the stock price. In the tax reform experiment of the next
section, both taxes fall, but  falls by more than  l e a d i n gt oar i s ei n.T h i se ﬀect will
thus be present but there are additional eﬀects arising from the change in .T h eo v e r a l l
eﬀect of a reform that reduces both is thus theoretically ambiguous and can only be obtained
by quantifying these mechanisms. This is the objective of the following two sections.
14With complete markets, the  eﬀect disappears, but the direct eﬀect on the after tax return to capital
is still present and, therefore, the capital gains tax will increase both the capital stock and the stock price
unambiguously.
134. Quantitative Results
This section uses a calibrated version of our model to study the eﬀects of the 2003 capital tax
reforms. First, we discuss the calibration and solution method for the benchmark economy.
Next, we study the eﬀects of a reduction in taxes both in the steady state and during the
transition.
4.1. Calibration. The time period is assumed to be one year. Preferences are of the
CRRA class, ()=[1−−1]
1− , with a risk aversion of  =2 . The production function is
Cobb-Douglas,  ()=1− with  =0 32 and the technology parameter  is
normalized so that output is equal to one in the steady state of the deterministic version of
our economy. We choose a discount factor  =0 92 to match an average capital to output
ratio of 28. The depreciation rate is set to  =0 103. Although this depreciation rate
implies a very high investment to output ratio, it is chosen to match the average dividend
to GDP ratio of 28% observed in NIPA data up to 2002.15.
The idiosyncratic labor productivity process is taken from Davila et. al (2007). They
construct the process so as to generate inequality measures for earnings and (endogenously)
wealth that are close to US data using a very parsimonious model16. As shown in Table 1, this
is achieved with a three-state Markov chain with a transition matrix Π(0|) exhibiting very
strong persistence and productivity values ² that assign productive individuals 46 times the
productivity of unproductive individuals. The resulting stationary distribution is denoted
by Π∗ and is also displayed in Table 1.



















We take our tax rates from Feenberg and Coutts (1993).17 These are Federal plus State
marginal tax rates for wages, qualiﬁed dividends and long term capital gains respectively.
For our benchmark economy we use  =0 28,  =0 31 and  =0 24which are the values
reported for 2002.18 With these taxes, the implied government to output ratio before the
reform is equal to 20%, which is very close to the government to output ratio of 19% in
the US. Feenberg and Coutts report marginal tax rates of 1842 and 1964 respectively for
15In a previous version of the paper we calibrated the capital depreciation rate to match the investment to
GDP ratio which resulted in a much higher dividend to GDP ratio. This, in turn, led to much larger eﬀects
of changes in dividend taxation. In this sense, our current calibration biases the quantitiative signiﬁcance of
our results downwards.
16For details on this see also Diaz, Pijoan-Mas, Rios-Rull (2003) and Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-
Rull (2003).
17The data we use can be downloaded from http://www.nber.org/taxsim.
18Using an average of the tax rates for years 1997 to 2002 gives essentially the same numbers.
142003. Since the intention of the reform was to equalize the two tax rates, and since the case
of equal tax rates is the standard theoretical benchmark with  = , it seems natural to
choose equal rates after the reform. Thus we assume dividend and capital gains tax rates
are reduced to  =  =0 19. In our main reform experiment, the labor tax rate adjusts
to balance the budget but we also consider an alternative reform where the lost government
revenue is covered using lump sum taxes.
4.2. Solution Method. To solve the model, we use a policy function iteration algorithm
that is described in detail in Appendix B. In order to evaluate the welfare eﬀect of tax reforms,
we have also computed the transition of our economy between the stationary distributions
of the pre reform and the post reform steady states. The extra diﬃculty of this exercise is
that factor prices and the distribution of individuals over asset holdings and labor income
change during the transition.
4.3. Welfare Eﬀects of Tax Reforms.
Long Run. This section analyzes the long run implications of revenue neutral tax
reforms that reduce dividend and (or) capital gains taxes at the expense of higher labor
income taxes. To isolate the eﬀects of each of these tax changes, we start by analyzing
a reduction in dividend taxes and capital gains taxes separately. First, we consider the
eﬀects of a reduction in the dividend tax rate while maintaining the capital gains tax at
 =0 24 (reform 1). Next, we consider a reform that reduces capital gains taxes while
keeping dividend taxes at the original level of  =0 31 (reform 2). Finally, we consider
the full tax reform in which both the dividend and the capital gains taxes are reduced to
19% (reform 3). In all the reforms we consider, the government is required to maintain a
balanced budget for the same level of government spending as in the benchmark economy.
This implies that labor taxes have to be adjusted upwards unless the reform is self-ﬁnancing
(see reform 2).
Table 2 reports the steady state results for the three experiments. The ﬁrst column
displays the results in the benchmark economy and the other three columns display the
resulting long run steady state values after each of the reforms. The diﬀerent rows display
the tax rates (), the stock return , the level of output  , the aggregate capital
,t h es t o c kp r i c e, the aggregate wage rate and dividends before taxes () and after
taxes ((1 − )(1 − )) as well as three measures of the long run welfare eﬀects of the
reform. First, we compute the welfare change , in consumption equivalent terms, based on
a utilitarian social welfare function. Second, we follow Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and
decompose the total consumption equivalent variation into an aggregate component ˆ  and a
distributional component ˜ .19
19The exact computations used are given in Appendix C. See also Domeij and Heathcote (2004) for more
details.
15Table 2: Long run eﬀects of tax reforms
Benchmark After Reform 1 After Reform 2 After Reform 3
() (031024028) (019024029) (031019028) (019019029)
 07 13 055 12
 136 132(−3%) 138(+15%) 133(−18%)
 382 346 (−94%) 399 (+42%) 362 (−5%)
 347 369 (+6%) 340 (−23%) 362 (+4%)
 0166 0160 (−36%) 0168 (+12%) 0163 (−18%)
(1 − ) 0119 0114 (−44%) 0121 (+17%) 0116 (−24%)
 0038 0062 (+39%) 0027 (−31%) 0052 (+36%)
(1 − ) 0026 0050 (+48%) 0019 (−27%) 0042(+62%)
ce total  0 −30% 09% −19%
ce aggregate ˆ  0 −08% 02% −05%
ce distribution ˜  0 −23% 07% −14%
Reform 1 reduces  from 031 to 019. Despite the large reduction in the tax rate, the
eﬀect on the government budget is quite small because we have calibrated our economy so
that dividend income is a small percentage of GDP. As a result, the government can balance
the budget by a very small increase in the labor tax rate, from 028 to 029. As described
in the previous section, the decrease in  raises the market value of capital and thus the
value of the assets held by individuals. This leads to an increase in the rate of return and
a decrease in the capital stock. In addition, there is a secondary channel through which
the capital stock is reduced. The reform leads to a change in the composition of income
with labor income, which is risky, becoming a smaller fraction of the total. This is both
because of taxation shifting from capital to labor and because of the endogenous response of
before-tax wages and dividends. Both mechanisms increase capital income and reduce labor
income, thus reducing the amount of risk faced by households and, consequently, reducing
precautionary savings. Overall, the capital stock falls by more than 9% while, at the same
time, the stock price rises by 6%.
Comparing welfare measures across steady states we ﬁnd that total welfare is reduced
by 3%. This can be decomposed into an aggregate and a distributional component following
Domeij and Heathcote (2004). Whereas they ﬁnd a positive aggregate eﬀect and a negative
distributional eﬀect of a reduction in capital income taxes, our ﬁnding is that both compo-
nents are negative. The negative aggregate welfare eﬀect is a direct result of the reduction in
the capital stock which, in the long run, reduces output and aggregate consumption.20 The
distributional eﬀect is negative for reasons similar to those found in the previous literature
on capital taxation. As labor income is reduced relative to capital income, individuals at the
low end of the wealth distribution suﬀer welfare losses whereas those at the high end enjoy
welfare gains. Given a utilitarian welfare function, and a strictly increasing marginal utility,
the loss of the wealth-poor section of the population is reﬂected more strongly in the aggre-
20As Davila et al. (2007) have shown, a reduction in precautionary savings is not eﬃcient. In fact, the
constrained eﬃcient allocation would require more capital than the market allocation.
16gate welfare measure. In sum, the reduction in the dividend tax increases the stock price
and it reduces both the aggregate capital stock and total welfare due to negative aggregate
and distributional eﬀects.
In many respects, the capital gains tax rate reduction works in the opposite direction.
Focusing on the results from reform 2, we see an increase in the capital stock and a decrease in
the rate of return. The stock price falls, because the eﬀect from the decrease in  dominates
the counteracting eﬀect of the decrease in the cost of capital, which pushes the capital
demand schedule (and thus the price) upwards. As the capital stock increases, that also
implies an increase in the marginal product of labor which increases labor income. Notice
that the labor tax rate is eﬀectively unchanged which reﬂects the fact that the government
collects no revenues from taxing capital gains at steady state. Thus, the reduction in the
capital gains tax rate does not deteriorate the government’s budget. In fact, because wages
increase as a result of the reform, the government can collect higher revenues from labor
taxes and the labor tax rate that balances the budget is slightly lower (not seen up to the
second digit reported). This reform is therefore self-ﬁnancing at steady state. Overall, the
welfare eﬀects of the capital gains tax decrease are positive but smaller than in the case of
dividend taxes. This largely reﬂects the fact that the capital gains tax rate falls by less than
the fall in the dividend tax in the ﬁrst reform. In sum, the decrease in the capital gains
tax decreases the stock price and it increases both the aggregate capital stock and the total
welfare due to positive aggregate and distributional eﬀects.
Once the two separate changes have been understood, the full reform (reform 3) follows
easily. The eﬀects of the reform are qualitatively the same as the dividend tax cut, but
quantitatively less strong because the capital gains tax rate reduction partly mitigates these
eﬀects. Quantitatively, we ﬁnd a 5% reduction in the long run capital stock, a 4% increase in
stock prices and a negative long run welfare eﬀect equivalent to a 2% permanent reduction
in consumption, arising both from reduced eﬃciency and reverse redistribution.
While looking at steady states provides important insights into the mechanisms taking
place in our model, it is also important to take into account the transitional eﬀects of the
tax reforms we consider. In fact, it is well known that results about the long run are often
mitigated, and sometimes even reversed, when the short run eﬀects are included. In our case,
this could clearly be the case, since the reduction in the aggregate capital stock arising from
the reform will reduce aggregate consumption in the long run but increase it in the short
run. We investigate this further in the next section.
Transition. In this section, we discuss the transitional paths for the full reform (Re-
form 3) only. We assume that the economy begins at a steady state with dividend taxes that
are equal to 31% and capital gains taxes that are equal to 24%. These taxes are unexpect-
edly and permanently reduced to 19% and 19% respectively and the economy is simulated
until convergence to the new steady state. Labor taxes are adjusted in every period of the
transition to keep the government budget balanced.
The paths for some of the key aggregate variables, expressed as a percentage of their
initial value, are displayed in Figures 5 and 6. The transitional paths are as expected. Ag-
17gregate capital decreases monotonically to the new steady state. The initial response of stock
prices is large, as  has suddenly risen while the capital stock has not had time to adjust.
As the economy reduces its capital stock, stock prices fall towards a new steady state, which
is higher than the old one. The aggregate wage rate follows a decreasing path, similar to
the one of the aggregate capital stock. The same is true for the after tax wage, but the
decrease in this is larger due to the higher labor income tax rate. Per share dividends also
rise sharply as investment is reduced and after tax dividends rise even more because the tax
rate has fallen. The subsequent downward adjustment in the capital stock brings dividends






















































After tax dividend as a % of initial
Figure 6: Aggregate Variable Transition Paths
18The sharp initial increase in after-tax dividends resulting from lower investment is also
reﬂected in the path for aggregate consumption displayed in the upper panel of Figure 7.
The initial increase is approximately 3%, but aggregate consumption starts falling as the
capital stock decreases. Eventually, aggregate consumption falls below the original steady
state and , in the long run, settles at a level approximately 05% below the pre-reform level.
This lower level of aggregate consumption in the long run is what leads to a negative
aggregate welfare eﬀect in the long run. The welfare eﬀects along the transition are depicted
in the lower panel of Figure 6. The decrease in welfare when the transition eﬀects are taken
into account is just above 05% of consumption. This is much less than the long run decrease
of 19% because of the temporary increase in aggregate consumption. In fact, the time path
of welfare gains follows closely the time path of aggregate consumption. Performing a de-
composition of the welfare gains reveals positive aggregate welfare gains of approximately
18% when the transition is taken into account. This is because the decrease in long run
consumption is dominated by the temporary increase in consumption in the short run. The
distributional component on the other hand is negative and larger, −23%.
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Welfare Gains (consumption equivalent)
Figure 7: Aggregate Consumption and Welfare gains in the full reform
It will also be interesting to decompose the welfare gains across individuals. Figure 8
provides such a decomposition. Speciﬁcally, it displays the total welfare gains in consumption
equivalent terms due to the full reform for individuals with diﬀerent income shocks and asset
levels. This ﬁgure is important for two reasons. It shows who gains and who loses from the
reform and it also indicates whether these reforms could have public support or not.
A couple of important observations emerge from the ﬁgure. First, welfare gains are
increasing in the amount of asset wealth held by an individual. Indeed, most individuals
holding stocks gain from this reform and only some individuals holding no stocks (and some
holding very few stocks) loose. This is not surprising, since the reform reduces the taxation
of asset wealth and increases the stock return. Second, for those holding a large amount of
asset wealth, the lower is their labor income, the more they beneﬁt from the reform. This
19is because among agents with the same asset level, agents with lower income levels rely less
on labor income in relative terms and therefore the increase in labor income taxes and the
decrease in wages hurts them the least.




































Figure 8: Individual Welfare Gains in the Full Reform
On the other hand, for those that hold little or no wealth, those with low labor income are
mostly hurt. This is because those agents enjoy very low levels of consumption anyway and
their marginal utility is very high. In addition, given the persistence of the labor productivity
process, they are unlikely to beneﬁt from low taxation of assets in the future either.
In terms of support for the reform, individuals at the low end of the wealth distribution
a n dw i t hl o wl a b o rp r o d u c t i v i t yw o u l dn o ts upport the reform. It turns out that the bulk
of the distribution is actually concentrated in this region. When we aggregate over the
population across asset levels and income levels using the stationary distribution of the pre-
reform steady state, we ﬁnd that the overall political support for the reform is 20 percent.
In sum, this reform would not get wide political support, mostly because of the strong
redistribution eﬀects from the poor to the rich.
5. Robustness
In this section we investigate how two of our assumptions aﬀect the results. In the ﬁrst part,
we consider using lump sum taxes to balance the budget instead of adjusting labor taxes
after the reform. In the second, we vary the degree of risk aversion. Throughout the section
we focus on steady state eﬀects.
5.1. Using Lump Sum Taxes. Our tax reform experiment in Section 4 assumes that
the government has a ﬁxed exogenous spending level  and maintains a balanced budget.
20Reductions in the taxation of dividends and capital gains are ﬁnanced by increasing labor
income taxes. Here we consider an alternative scenario, in which labor income taxes are kept
ﬁx e da f t e rt h er e f o r ma n dt h ee x t r ar e v e n u ei sr a i s e dt h r o u g ht h eu s eo fl u m ps u mt a x e s .T h e
results of this experiment are shown in Table 3. The second column (labelled ‘Benchmark’)
is simply a repetition of the equilibrium values before the reform from Table 2. The third






 383 367 (−42%)
 348 367 (+55%)
 0166 0164 (−12%)
 ∗ (1 − ) 0119 0118 (−1%)
 0038 0049 (+28%)
 ∗ (1 − ) 0026 0039 (−50%)
cons. equiv. (ce),  0 −48%
ce aggregate, ˆ  0 −03%
ce distributional, ˜  0 −45%
Qualitatively, this alternative reform does not change the result of the previous section.
The capital stock falls by slightly less and the stock price increases by slightly more. The most
signiﬁcant diﬀerence is in the welfare loss of the reform, which is now much larger due to a
much larger distributional eﬀect. To understand why this happens it is important to notice
that labor supply is exogenous so the labor income tax rate does not directly distort the
supply of labor. In fact, in the absence of heterogeneity, this tax would be non-distortionary
and equivalent to a lump sum tax. In our economy with heterogeneity however, both the
labor tax and the lump sum taxes aﬀect allocations by changing the distribution of income.
The question is which one has a stronger eﬀect and why. An increase in labor tax rates has
negative distributional eﬀects in the sense that poorer households rely more heavily on labor
income and are therefore hurt relatively more. Since these households have higher marginal
utility, the eﬀect on aggregate welfare is negative. But at least this tax is proportional to a
household’s labor income so, the level of taxes raised from poorer households is less than that
raised from richer households. If instead the reform is ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes that are
equally spread across households, this negative distributional welfare eﬀect is even stronger.
This explains the diﬀerence that we see in Table 3.
We have also considered ﬁnancing the reduction in capital taxes through an individual
speciﬁc lump sum tax. This tax was constructed so that, at the pre-reform allocation,
each household ends up with the same tax bill after the reform as before the reform. This
would completely neutralize any eﬀects dividend taxes except for the wealth eﬀect operating
through the change in . But the increase in  means that the capital stock will still have to
21fall. Thus, welfare is still reduced in this case, albeit by less.
5.2. Varying Risk Aversion. It should be clear from the discussion in Section 3 that
the slope of the  schedule is crucial for determining the magnitude of the wealth eﬀect
on the capital stock. The eﬀect is zero when the slope is zero and it is maximized when the
slope is inﬁnite. Recall, in addition, that the reduction in the capital gains tax has a second
eﬀect on the capital stock that is actually positive and that survives a perfectly elastic 
schedule. It follows that in the extreme case where  is perfectly elastic, this positive eﬀect
on the capital stock should dominate the negative wealth eﬀect, whereas when  is very
steep, the negative wealth eﬀect should dominate. It turns out that the level of risk aversion
has a direct eﬀe c to nt h i ss l o p e .A st h el e v e lo fr i s ka v e r s i o ni sd e c r e a s e d ,t h ea s s e td e m a n d
schedule  moves to the left and the equilibrium capital stock is reduced. Importantly,
the relevant section of the demand schedule, i.e. the section that lies to the right of the
complete markets level of wealth, becomes ﬂatter. In the limit, as  → 0, the demand
for assets approaches the complete markets demand schedule, which is perfectly elastic at
 = 1
 − 1. At that limiting point, the equilibrium level of the capital stock is simply the
modiﬁed golden rule and there are no precautionary savings. The negative wealth eﬀect
is not present anymore and the reform increases the capital stock. When the level of risk
aversion is increased above a threshold, the negative wealth eﬀect dominates and the capital
stock falls as a result of the reform. This reduction in the capital stock becomes larger as
risk aversion is further increased. This intuition is borne out in the quantitative experiment
described below.
T a b l e4b e l o wp r e s e n t st h ec h a n g e si nt h em a i nv a r i a b l e so fi n t e r e s ta sw e l la st h ew e l f a r e
gains or losses arising due to the reform in three diﬀerent economies. The three economies
diﬀer in their level of risk aversion. We consider a case with low ( =0 5)a n dac a s ew i t h
high ( =5 ) risk aversion and compare to our benchmark economy ( =2 ).21
Table 4: Long run eﬀects of tax reform for diﬀerent risk aversion
Risk Aversion Low ( =0 5) Medium ( =2 ) High ( =5 )
∆ +0005 +001 +001
∆ +01 +05 +082
%∆ −03% −18% −38%
%∆ −08% −5% −11%
%∆ +92% +4% −2%
%∆ −05% −18% −37%
%∆(1 − ) −1% −24% −5%
%∆ +55% +36% 72%
%∆(1 − ) +24% +62% 101%
The changes in the labor tax rate and in the rate of return after the reform are reported
in percentage points whereas the rest are reported as percent changes. Clearly, the eﬀect
21For each , the pre reform economy is recalibrated to meet the calibration targets described in Section
4. Speciﬁcally, we modify the discount factor to obtain the same capital output ratio of 28.
22of the reform on the capital stock is larger the larger is the value of .T h e t h r e s h o l d ,
at which the capital stock actually rises is below 05.T h ee ﬀect on the stock price changes
s i g n ,f r o ma ni n c r e a s ei nt h es t o c kp r i c ef o rl o wa n dm e d i u mr i s ka v e r s i o nt oad e c r e a s ei n
the stock price when risk aversion is relatively high. At that extreme, the fall in the capital
stock is so large that the increase in the valuation  of this capital is not enough to raise the
price.
6. Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀects of reducing dividend and capital gains taxes. Our ﬁnding that
reductions in these taxes lead to reverse redistribution, and hence are detrimental from the
point of view of a utilitarian social welfare function, are in line with previous research on
capital tax reforms. The new insight obtained by disaggregating capital taxes into dividend
and capital gains taxes is that a dividend tax cut can have the exact opposite eﬀect from
the one intended, i.e. it can reduce investment instead of increasing it. We have explained
this result using an analogy with the q theory of investment. We have also provided a
quantitative assessment of the 2003 JGTRRA reform and found it to be welfare reducing,
even after positive short run eﬀects are taken into account. While our framework is relatively
realistic, we have abstracted from several, potentially interesting aspects of such a reform
which we brieﬂy mention here.
Clearly, when studying a reform that perturbs labor taxes, there are potentially important
endogenous adjustments in labor supply. We abstract from those by assuming labor supply is
exogenous. In the absence of heterogeneity, simple intuition would suggest that, allowing for
endogenous labor supply, the reform would introduce additional distortions and potentially
decrease welfare further. With heterogeneity, this intuition is complicated by the fact that
taxation has additional distributional eﬀects.
Another simpliﬁcation of our framework is that we assume ﬂat rate taxes. Introducing
progressivity in income taxation could allow for implementing such a reform without incur-
ring welfare losses. This could be achieved by simultaneously increasing the progressivity of
income taxes so that the negative redistribution is mitigated or even reversed, as in Ábrahám
and Cárceles-Poveda (2010).
Finally, our treatment of capital gains taxes simpliﬁes the computational burden signif-
icantly but is arguably unrealistic. Capital gains in practice are taxed only when realized
and this allows individuals to time the realization of capital gains in their favor. It is often
suggested, see for example Gourio and Miao (2008) or Sinn (1991), that this could be crudely
modelled as an accrual tax at a lower rate. To the extent this is true, our main result of
a fall in the capital stock and in welfare should survive such an extension since this would
reduce the eﬀects of capital gains taxes. One could also explicitly model realization-based
capital gains taxes along the lines of Gavin et. al. (2007), but at a higher computational
cost.
Finally, the work of Gourio and Miao (2010) has shown that ﬁrm heterogeneity could be
important in analyzing a dividend tax reform. Given that their results in terms of capital
accumulation are opposite to ours, it would be very interesting to combine ﬁrm heterogeneity
23and household heterogeneity in order to assess which eﬀect dominates and the extent to which
there are interactions between the two. However, it is not clear whether this is feasible with
the current state of knowledge in models of heterogeneity.
APPENDIX
Appendix A: The Relationship between the Stock Price and the Capital Stock
Using the deﬁnition of the risk-free return, together with the stock Euler condition (4),
we can write the stock price at time  as:
 (1 + +1)=[ ( 1− )+1 + +1 −  (+1 − )]











and repeated forward substitution, along with a no-bubble condition, yields the price divi-
dend mapping (6). The capital Euler condition (9) can be manipulated to write capital as a
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Comparing (13) to (6) gives the relationship between capital and stock price in equation
(10).
Appendix B: Numerical Algorithm
B.1 Computing the Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
We use a generalized policy function iteration which relies on the ﬁrst-order conditions
(mainly the Euler equation) of the model. Furthe r ,w ea p p r o x i m a t ea l lt h er e l e v a n tp o l i c ya n d
24value functions with linear interpolation over a ﬁnite but endogenous grid on assets. To solve
the individual problem with policy iterations, we proceed as follows. Given the aggregate
capital ,t h es t o c kp r i c e, dividends , the wage rate  and a tax vector (),w el e t
 be the vector consisting of the individual policy functions of interest, i.e.,  =[ 0].L e t
 be a non-linear operator such that [; ] satisﬁes the individual optimality
conditions given taxes. To approximate the ﬁxed point, we follow the steps below.
Step 1: Guess an initial vector [0;00
],w h e r e0 =[ 0 00].U s i n g 0 we can calculate
00 and 0.
Step 2: For each iteration  ≥ 1, use the previous guess −1 and [−1−1−1−1
  −1]
to compute the new vector  that satisﬁes the individual equilibrium conditions.
Step 3: Using  and the distribution for the idiosyncratic shock Π,c a l c u l a t eΨ,t h ej o i n t
(stationary) distribution of assets and income. Next, use Ψ to calculate the aggregate
demand for stocks by the ﬁrm to get the new stock price .
Step 4: The new tax rate on labor 
 is calculated given Ψ and  to satisfy the government’s
budget constraint.
Step 5: Repeat Steps 2-4 until convergence.
Note that our setting requires the introduction of some notable diﬀerences with respect
to the standard procedure to solve models with uninsurable income shocks.
B.2 Computing the Transition Between Steady States
When we calculate the transition between steady states we need to adjust the above
procedure in the following way. First, for the sake of the exposition assume that convergence
to the new steady state takes place in  periods. Then we follow the steps below.






























=1. We then initialize the ﬁrst period with stationary
distribution of the ﬁrst steady state (Ψ0
1 = Ψ1 and 0
1 = 1) and we assume that
at time  we are already in the second steady state (Ψ0
 = Ψ2 and 0
 = 2)).
Step 2: For each iteration  ≥ 1 and for each time period 1 ≤  ≤  −1,w eu s et h ep r e v i o u s







 ] to compute the
new vector 
 that satisﬁes the individual equilibrium conditions.
Step 3: Using  and Π, we calculate Ψ
+1, the joint distribution of assets and income and
then use Ψ
+1 to calculate the demand of stocks and the new price 
 .T h e s e t w o
variables are compared the initial guesses Ψ−1
+1 and −1
 for all 1 ≤  ≤  − 1.
Step 4: The new tax rate on labor for each time period 1 ≤  ≤  − 1 is calculated given
Ψ−1
 and 
 to satisfy the government’s budget constraint at each period.
25Step 5: Repeat Steps 2-4 until convergence for all periods 1 ≤  ≤  − 1.
Appendix C: Welfare Computation and Decomposition
Transition
The economy begins at an initial steady state (at  =0 ) with a given, constant level
of aggregate capital  and an initial distribution of stocks Ψ. The change in the tax
system induces a sequence of aggregate capital stocks and distributions {Ψ}

=0 that
eventually converges (at time ) to the new steady state  Ψ.L e t  =( ) be a
point in the individual state space of the economy. Given the sequence of aggregates,t h e
maximized utility (value function) for an individual household with individual state  at time
 is denoted by  (). Similarly, denote the corresponding consumption and stock policy
functions by () and () respectively. At steady state the aggregates are constant and
the value functions are time independent. We use  () and  () for the steady state
value functions before and after the reform22. The welfare of an individual household at any









where (+|) is the probability of state + given .T ob em o r ep r e c i s e ,t h i sv a l u ec a n







Π(+1|)+1 (+1 ( ))
This representation can be used to compute 0(0) backwards starting at  ()= ().
Clearly, 0(0) represents the welfare of an individual with individual state 0 in the econ-












These individual welfare levels can be aggregated to yield a (utilitarian) measure of aggre-










We use  and 
0 to compare the welfare with and without the reform. Speciﬁcally,
we compute the equivalent variation in consumption, ,d e ﬁned as the percent increase in
22We do the same for the policy functions.
26consumption in every date/event of the economy without reform that is required to make








If 0, then consumption in the old equilibrium would need to be decreased, indicating
that aggregate welfare is lower in the new equilibrium.
To decompose the overall welfare eﬀect into the aggregate and the distributional com-
ponents we follow the idea in Domeij and Heathcote (2004). For the aggregate component,
we consider a hypothetical economy that shares all the features of the pre-reform economy,
except that consumption is scaled by the ratio of aggregate consumptions in the pre- and
post-reform economies, since we maintain thes a m ec o n s u m p t i o nd i s t r i b u t i o na f t e rt h er e -
form. Let the aggregate consumptions be denoted by 
 and  (note the pre-reform
economy is in steady state so aggregate consumption would be constant across time). Then















































With ˆ 0(0 0) in hand, the aggregate component of welfare can be computed just like before




















27Comparing steady states is more controversial because of the diﬀerent distributions as-
sociated with the diﬀerent steady states. We compare steady state welfare making some








i.e. by comparing the average welfare level in the two steady states. We also decompose
this into aggregate and distributional components. The aggregate component is computed
by assuming that the distribution is the same in the two steady states and only adjusting
individual consumptions by the ratio of aggregate consumptions. This leads to an aggregate




The distributional component is then deﬁned as a residual just like before.
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